fewer competing chiefs, have worse development outcomes in terms of education attainment, child health, and non-agricultural employment. They argue that less competition for the chieftaincy allows local power holders to use traditional mechanisms of social control rather than build community development through providing public goods. Fearon et al. (2009) argue that chieftaincy buy-in to externally-funded development projects is an important pre-condition to their success in northern Liberia. This research shows that temporary donor-driven Community Development Committees (CDCs) produced higher levels of social and economic cohesion and larger contributions by citizens to public goods games in villages where local chiefs and village elders cooperated, rather than competed, with the new CDCs. These two studies support our intuition that the nature of the relationship between councilors and chiefs is an important factor for distributional outcomes. However, the findings are somewhat contradictory. Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2013) find that competition is good for public goods provision, whereas Fearon et al. (2009) find that cooperation is beneficial. Neither study, however, directly investigates relationships that necessitate long-term power sharing between different types of local elites.
Indeed, with a few notable exceptions (see Treisman 2006; Beramendi 2012), this
literature has yet to seriously take into account the fact that decentralization empowers new sets of local actors and overlays them onto existing political, economic, and social systems. To address this lacuna, we seek to understand how the introduction of new local power holders and new institutions that necessitate long-term power sharing have shaped, or reshaped, the incentives of other relevant actors at the local level to provide public goods.
Section 3: The Case of Sierra Leone

Power-Sharing Tension and Conflict
Tensions between levels of government in Sierra Leone are not new. The British created several versions of district councils during colonialism to oversee local governance, but this system was not maintained by Sierra Leone's post-independence government (Barrows 1976) .
Many attributed the failure of the district councils to their successful co-optation by Paramount Chiefs, 2 which was exacerbated when former Prime Minister (1968 Minister ( -1971 chiefs who were supporters of his regime (Mitton 2009; Richards 1996) . 3 The Sierra Leonean Civil War was also rife with tensions between local elites and militias. War began in 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attacked the Sierra Leone Army from across the Liberian border. In 1992, the All People's Congress (APC) was ousted by a military coup, and the newly formed National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) continued to battle against RUF rebels. Another coup in 1996 returned Sierra Leone to civilian rule and ushered in the presidency of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP). Despite being ousted briefly by a coup in 1997, which brought the RUF to power, Kabbah maintained leadership of the SLPP throughout the war. During his tenure, Kabbah coordinated with existing community militias to protect villages against RUF abuse by creating an organization of Civil Defense Forces (CDF). Over the course of the war, the CDF became the main paramilitary offensive to protect the SLPP regime (see Gberie 2005; Richards 1996) .
In CDF controlled regions, primarily concentrated in the east, the militias relied on Paramount Chiefs for financial support (Hoffman 2011) . Chiefs were motivated to help the CDF fight the RUF, as the RUF targeted chiefs and members of their households (Sacks and Larizza 2011, 13) . The power of chiefs was also heightened in CDF-controlled areas as central authority from Freetown eroded as the war progressed (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008, 441-443 ; see also Keen 2005).
Decentralization in Sierra Leone
In post-conflict Sierra Leone, decentralization has created new authority structures that must compete with the interests of local chiefs who operate within their own long entrenched ! 8! commission of offences" and maintain order and good government, 3) to preserve and promote traditions and customs, 4) to serve as an agent of development and 5) to supervise the election of sub-chiefs. As this list suggests, the exact formal role of the Paramount Chiefs remains opaque both in law and in practice. For example, the councils and chiefdoms are required to share revenue raised from local taxes and mining (LGA 2004, 33) , but neither the Chieftaincy Act nor the LGA specifies an exact protocol for this process. 4 Unsurprisingly the opaque nature of the formal power-sharing responsibilities between councilors and chiefs has led to local tensions. As one observer notes, the 2004 LGA and the 2009 Chieftaincy Act "did not bring closure to the relationship between local councils and chiefs," and though chiefs are legally subordinate to local councils, the chiefs "have not accepted this hierarchy" (Fofanah 2011) . Fofanah (2011) provides further examples of councilor/chief tensions, including Paramount Chiefs collecting revenue but never turning over the precept to the local council, while local councilors have also been reported to collect their own taxes independent of chiefs.
Section 4: Power Sharing and Public Goods Provision
In this section we explore how power-sharing tensions created through decentralization may affect the provision of local public goods. We first outline explicit relationships between chiefs and councilors (contact, disputes, and familial relations) and derive expectations about how these relationships might affect the distribution of public goods. We then examine other compositional characteristics that might affect the nature of interactions between councilors and chiefs and thus indirectly affect local development. Finally, we outline additional council-level compositional variables that may also affect public goods outcomes unrelated to councilor/chief interactions. We lay out or theoretical expectations here, but discuss the specific operationalization of our key dependent, independent, and control variables in Section 5.
According to the LGA (2004, 35) three months before the end of every fiscal year, local councils set the amount of taxes to be collected in their locality, as well as the percentage of the tax to be paid to the council (the precept). The council then notifies the chiefdom and the chiefdom is responsible for collecting local taxes and remitting the precept to the local council during the following fiscal year. The LGA establishes no minimum or maximum percentage that the precept should be nor does it specify a set amount for the chiefdoms to keep. Local councils are also responsible for all expenditures related to carrying out the devolved functions and for preparation of annual budgets. They can also use council assets for income generation for the council and borrow money. We assume here that the general nature of the relationships between councilors and chiefs may take on one of two broad forms: competition or collusion. We expect competitive relationships to be defined by frequent self-reported disputes between councilors and chiefs.
Collusion, in contrast, may take several forms that vary on the extent to which the two groups actually share power. In a more equal power-sharing scenario, collusion might best be described as cooperation in which both chiefs and councilors divide fiscal and policymaking responsibilities equally or come to decisions through consensus. In more unequal relationships, however, collusion may be better expressed as cooption in which one group has been able to capture the complete decision-making authority of the other. Given the history of decentralization and the traditional power base of Paramount Chiefs in Sierra Leone, we expect this type of capture to be in the direction of chiefs coopting the authority of local councilors, rather than local councilors successfully superseding chiefs' authority.
The literature outlined above suggests several potential, and at times contradicting, ways in which the nature of councilor/chief relationships may affect local development outcomes.
First, competition between local elites may be beneficial for the provision of local public goods, as some research suggests that existing elites support institutional innovation when there is a high degree of political competition from rival elite groups (Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson 2013; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006) . Given that the introduction of local councils effectively dissolved chiefs' formal monopoly on local authority, decentralization may have prompted both groups to invest more in local public goods as they each vie for the public's commitment to their authority. Of course, however, when both groups use their positions to invest in private goods to maintain or build patronage networks, inter-elite competition may come at the expense of local public goods provision. In addition, when disputes hinder the ability of either group to Draft as of 11.06.2014 ! 10! effectively provide public goods -for instance, when on group seeks to actively obstruct the authority of the other -we also expect inter-elite competition to harm local development outcomes.
There are also theoretically based reasons to expect that relationships defined by cooperation, rather than competition, will be beneficial to the provision of local public goods.
For instance, as Fearon et al. (2009) suggest, chieftaincy support of local council projects may increase the chances of programmatic success. Further, Logan's (2008, iii) analysis of Afrobarometer data from 15 countries on the continent, finds that respondents' evaluations of newly decentralized local authorities and hereditary chiefs move together, noting "local traditional leaders appear to draw their sustenance and legitimacy from the same well as elected officials."
This suggests that rather than control over local power and resources being a zero-sum game, cooperative relationships between chiefs and councilors may be beneficial for public goods outcomes as well as public perceptions of the quality of local government. If these types of cooperative inter-elite relationships are at play, closer ties between councilors and chiefs should be associated with greater levels of public goods.
Yet other research on the political economy of Africa suggests an opposite effect. Close inter-elite relationships may indicate that councilors are benefitting from chiefs' clientelistic networks to buy votes and ensure future electoral support. In such instances, patronage-based redistribution may come at the expense of public goods provision (Bratton 2008; Collier & Vicente 2012; Keefer 2005; van de Walle 2003 van de Walle , 2012 Wantchekon 2003) . In addition, if councilors draw their legitimacy indirectly from the support of chiefs rather than from their performance, the accountability of local governance and thus councilors' incentives to invest in public goods also decline. In such scenarios, we expect that closer inter-elite relationships defined by frequent contact in the absence of disputes and a higher frequency of councilor/chief familial ties will lead to worse local development outcomes.
In sum, both theoretical and empirical work on inter-elite competition and local governance suggest countering expectations on the ways in which the nature of inter-elite relationships will affect the ability of both groups to effectively provide local public goods. We hope to contribute to this debate by providing direct evidence on different types of self-reported inter-elite relationships as we explore how power-sharing dynamics affect different dimensions of local public goods provision. 
Party and Electoral Competition
Political parties and electoral competition shape incentives of political elites. Under certain conditions, electoral competition can create accountability and upward pressure on politicians as they must be responsive to the needs of their constituents (Hecock 2006) . Increased electoral competition, however, has not led to universal improvements in development outcomes in many young African democracies. Rather competition in areas with weak electoral oversight creates incentives for politicians to devote resources to foster private political patronage rather than to invest in public goods (Bratton 2008; Collier and Vicente 2012; van de Walle 2003 van de Walle , 2007 . Examining politicians' tendencies towards clientelisim in further detail in Sierra Leone, Jablonski, Sacks, and Larizza (n.d.) argue that the impact of competition on public goods provision is mediated by a candidate's wealth, either from personal assets or access to the ruling SLPP coffers. 5 When politicians have funds available, they will respond to electoral competition with vote buying. When they lack discretionary income, they will respond with more investments in public service projects. Therefore when electoral competition is high, we expect higher SLPP membership to be associated with increased public goods provisions.
CDF Membership
As described in Section 3, during Sierra Leone's civil war, the Civilian Defense Force and Paramount Chiefs operated under a reciprocal relationship in which the CDF relied upon chiefs for funding and the chiefs depended on the CDF for protection against the RUF. We therefore expect that councilors who were previously in the CDF will have strong preexisting authority. Of course, whether these close relationships are beneficial or detrimental to local development outcomes relates to our main empirical question discussed above -and we are agnostic to the effect of prior CDF membership on local development outcomes when it is not moderating councilor/chief relationships.
Age and Education
The elder/youth divide served as a key demographic cleavage during Sierra Leone's long civil war. Student radicals opposed to the one-party regime of the APC originally formed the RUF. The student led ideology of the RUF did not last long into the conflict, but as the war progressed, the RUF recruited alienated youth in Freetown and abducted youth from the countryside (Abdullah 1998; Mokuwa et al. 2011; Peters and Richards 2011; Richards 1996) .
Indeed, by the conflict's end more than half of the 75,000 combatants in the RUF were children between the ages of 8-14 years of age (Peter and Richards 1998, 186) .
In part because of the war's legacy, age continues to be a politically salient feature of Sierra Leonean politics, and this may have indirect effects on potential councilor/chief relationships. The chieftaincy in Sierra Leone is largely composed of community elders, whereas the local councils on average recruit a younger demographic; implying members of these two groups are likely to have experienced the war differently. 6 We expect that councils that are on average younger may have more autonomy from pre-existing elites than those that are on average older. We include mean councilor age in our models on the assumption that it may help shape interactions between councilors and chiefs, but again we are agnostic to the effect this may have on public service provision separate from how it moderates councilor/chief relationships.
We also expect that councilor median education may inform how councilors value public goods, such as education and healthcare. In particular, we hypothesize that higher average education levels of councilors will be associated with increased public goods provision in their districts ceteris paribus.
The DSS report notes that the 2004 Local council cohort had a median age of 50, whereas the 2008 cohort had a median age of 44. The median age of the Paramount Chiefs is 60 (Kpaka 2011). Additionally, we are aware that the concept of youth in the Sierra Leonean context means unmarried, not young in age. However, we do not have data on marriage rates in the Local councils, but we assume that age is at least a partial proxy for marriage. In addition, the gender composition of local councils may mediate the potential for different types of councilor/chief relations. Recent work from a policy experiment with reserved electoral districts for female councilors in Lesotho presents evidence that traditional leaders loose authority in districts reserved for women because the presence of female councilors implicitly challenges the patrilineal tradition on which chiefs base their authority (Clayton 2014).
Again, however, how this dynamic affects local development outcomes relates to our main empirical question.
In addition to these council-level compositional variables, we discuss the EA-level controls we include in our models in Section 5.3.
Section 5: Data, Measures, and Methods
Our analysis draws on data from two types of surveys in Sierra Leone. First, we create the local council variables from the Decentralization Stakeholders Survey (DSS), which was given to all local authorities affected by the decentralization process. We use data from the survey conducted immediately after the 2008 local council elections that surveys councilors from As an additional indicator of health care provision we take a survey question from the 2011 NPS survey that directly asks respondents: "What do you think has happened to the quality of government health services in the last year?" Household respondents could report on a five-
In Sierra Leone, devolution of public service delivery to the local councils has largely meant the direct transfer of block grants to council accounts. These block grants cover basic maintenance of the programs and are used for the local implementation of public policies set at the ministry or central government level for that particular issue area. The LGA only guarantees that the annual grants are enough for basic maintenance of services. Therefore, other forms of local revenue stemming from local tax collection or mining revenue, or the precept that councils collect from Paramount Chiefs, are important components of local council budgets. The actual local council budgets in 2011 help verify this assumption, as many councils spend more, some much more, on health and education than the block grants that they receive from the central government. 8 There have been four rounds of the NPS surveys: 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 . We use the 2008 and 2011 surveys, and we prefer the measure of self-reported distance to the nearest health center. The survey also asks how long it takes to get there in minutes. We choose not to use this measure because the time it takes to get to a health center could also be a function of infrastructure (i.e. if roads have improved in the area) and household wealth (i.e. if the respondent is now able to take a public bus rather than walk), Draft as of 11.06.2014 ! 15! point Likert-type scale that government health services had gone from much worse to much better over the previous year, with higher values on the scale associated with perceptions of greater improvements in of the quality of government health services. Again we average these responses to EA level to create our second dependent variable. We consider public perceptions of the quality of government health services an important area of inquiry separate from actual usage of these services. The decentralization process in Sierra Leone was at least partially motivated by the belief that many grievances during the civil war were related to the centralized nature of the state, leading ultimately to a lack of government accountability and low levels of trust among citizens. Because fiscal decentralization was intended to increase public knowledge of government led service provision, whether citizens actually observe and approve of changes in these services is an important indicator of the success decentralization initiatives, and, therefore, a potentially important antecedent to trust in local government (see Sacks and Larizza 2011).
Our third dependent variable is access to public education services, which will indicate the degree to which our findings are consistent across different types of public goods. We measure the provision of public education as whether families with school age children report that their children attended government schools on the 2011 NPS. Although local councils did not receive direct transfers for education until 2007 (Casey 2009), this function was devolved to the cohort of councilors included in our surveys, causing us to expect a substantive impact in this policy area as well. Ideally we would also include a dependent variable measuring variation in public goods that remain in the domain of the chiefdoms, such as security and the maintenance of order, to assess whether power-sharing dynamics affect the provision of these goods.
Unfortunately, the NPS does not include indicators of this nature. Table 1 reports the correlations between our three dependent variables, which indicate the extent to which the three measures of service delivery are related to each other six years after the Local Governance Act initiated the process of decentralization. We note that the use of government health services and government schools are moderately positively correlated in our data, suggesting public investments in government and education generally move together.
Further these values are not correlated in 2008 (r = -0.007), suggesting that the correlation in the 2011 usage levels are related to simultaneous improvements in public heath and education provision at the council level. This discrepancy between self-reported usage and perceptions of quality can be interpreted in at least three ways. First, it is possible that because fiscal authority over health spending was one of the first functions devolved to local authorities, councilors might have devoted funds to improving access to local health facilities early in their tenure, so that by 2011 respondents would not report improvements during the previous year. Second, it is possible that whether or not citizens use government health facilities is quite separate from the quality of services they receive at these facilities. As current media attention to the Ebola outbreak has highlighted, access to government health facilities does not mean that these facilities will be adequately staffed or well stocked. Finally, it is possible that the low level of correlation between our measures of perceptions and usage suggests that one of these measures may be a more valid and reliable indicator of local public health provision than the other.
Each of these possible interpretations indicates to us the importance of measuring health facility usage and quality of services separately, allowing us to robustly test the council-level effects on different dimensions of service delivery. Further, we argue that the relatively low levels of correlation between our dependent variables strengthens our ability to test for the effects councilor/ chief interactions on different dimensions of service delivery. That is, the results we present below demonstrate how inter-elite relationships shape fairly independent measures of service delivery, rather than displaying similar effects across highly correlated dependent variables. 
Section 5.2: Independent Variables and Controls
In Section 4 we listed a host of explanatory variables that might affect the provision of public goods either directly or indirectly by shaping the nature of the relationship between councilors and chiefs. We operationalize direct relationships between councilors and chiefs within any given council by using three council-level indicators: the median number of times councilors report having contacted a chief in the previous month, the percentage of councilors that report having had a dispute with a chief during the past month, and the percentage of councilors that report that they are related to a Paramount Chief either through blood or marriage. We operationalize our other council-level compositional variables as follows: we measure CDF membership by the percentage of councilors who report having been a CDF member during the war. We also include the percentage of seats held by female councilors, the percentage of seats held by the ruling SLPP party, the mean education level of councilors, and mean councilor age. Finally, following Jablonski, Sacks, and Larizza (n.d.), we include a measure of electoral competition in our models, which we operationalize as the log of the mean number of candidates per council seat. Some research suggests that Sierra Leoneans who experienced violence during the war are more likely to register to vote, to attend community meetings, to participate in political and community groups, and to contribute to local public goods (Bellows and Miguel 2009, 1145) .
This heightened civic participation may independently increase the success of public goods provision. Therefore, we control for the war's impact. We measure this by aggregating the household war experiences of respondents using a series 2007 NPS household survey questions that asks respondents: if they or anyone they knew was maimed or killed during the war, had a house that was destroyed, or had to flee. We include the former measure in the following models, but our results are also robust to the latter two measures. 10 From the 2007 community-level NPS surveys we also include several measures of EA remoteness, specifically the distance in miles
Many questions were asked either in 2007 or 2008 causing us to pull from both survey rounds to include as many control variables as possible. 10 We might also expect that areas that saw the heaviest fighting would have fewer remaining health centers and a larger population with an objectively greater need for these services, leading us to observe improvements in these districts first. However, this appears not to be the case. Huge populations shifted to Freetown during the war, which caused public goods to be delivered to the capital first. The worst hit areas, such as Kono and Kailahun, had come to either rely on aid agencies or were self-sufficient (Fanthorpe 2011 Related to community health and development, we include a measure of the main water source in the community (community well or tap rather than a river or stream) as well as the average number of respondents per EA that were treated for malaria in the last year. We also include a measure from 2007 indicating whether a Paramount Chief or local councilor visited the EA during the previous year. Finally we include 2008 baseline measures of use of government health and school services so that our models capture the magnitude of change in public service provision across council areas. We discuss how to interpret these results within a hierarchical structure at length below. See Table 1 in the appendix for a full a list of our independent variables and controls, as well as their operationalization and data source.
Section 5.4: Modeling Strategy
Our analysis employs multi-level models, which best reflect our particular nested data structure, micro-level units (enumeration areas) clustered within macro-level units (council areas). By design, the local councils are responsible for service delivery across enumeration areas in their districts, and multi-level models allow us to capture this within group dependence by accounting for both EA and council-level variation in estimating council-level regression coefficients (Gelman and Hill 2007, Snijders and Bosker 2012) . If we fail to account for the clustered nature of our data we inherently violate the basic assumption of multiple regression:
that our micro-level units are independently and identically distributed. Multi-level analysis allows us to first measure and then model dependence between EA observations clustered within councils. We first measure this internal homogeneity in our council-level observations with respect to our three dependent variables through their respective interclass correlation coefficients (ICCs). The ICC measures the proportion of the total variance for each of the three outcome variables that are accounted for at the council-level. Put another way, the ICC reveals the predicted correlation between each outcome variable measured for two randomly drawn EAs in the same council area (Snijders and Bosker 2012, 72) . Table 2 shows the ICC by council area for each of our three outcome variables as well as the 95 percent confidence intervals that bracket each of these estimates. The high (and statistically greater than zero) inter-class correlation coefficients for each of our three dependent variables confirm that public service provision is indeed highly clustered by council area. This accurately reflects our assumptions about the extent to which decentralization has empowered local councils to affect council-wide public service provision since their creation in 2005. The fact that we observe higher levels of correlation by council area for government health services rather than education also reflects the timing of decentralization, as health was the first public service devolved to the local councils. The high level of councillevel correlation for each of our three outcome variables also corroborates our intuition that multi-level models are indeed the most appropriate specification for analyzing council-level characteristics on EA-level outcomes.
In order to directly model within council dependence, we use random intercepts at the council level in the multi-level specifications that follow. This allows us to properly account for the nested structure of our data while maintaining the assumption that the effect size within any particular council area, controlling for other observable explanatory variables, is interchangeable.
That is, in contrast to models that employ random coefficients, we have no a priori expectations about how the magnitude of our key independent variables (the coefficient slope) might depend on any particular council. Rather, our theoretical expectations suggest that the effect size of councilor-chief relations should be generalizable across council areas. However, we test this assumption further in Section 6. By design, multi-level models allow us to include explanatory variables at the both EA and council levels. The EA-level explanatory variables can be interpreted as capturing both within and across council variation. Each EA-level regression coefficient has both a within group and a between group component. The reported coefficients fall between the two level-specific coefficients, and are weighted by the number of EA observations within each council area and the amount of variance accounted for between councils (the ICC). If we were interested in In the models that follow, we include the 2008 values of our EA-level measures of education and health care provision. Again, because the council-level variables do not vary within council areas or over time, the coefficients only explain the difference between councils.
Including these baseline values allows us to capture the extent to which service provision has increased or decreased across councils as a function of our council-level variables of interest and our EA-level controls, including the 2008 baseline values. We note, however, that the key findings we present below hold when removing the baseline 2008 measures -and we include the associated regression tables in Appendix 2. We also discuss how to interpret the magnitude of
Our results, however, are robust to list-wise deletion. 
6.1: Main Results
Use of Government Health Services
Our first dependent variable relates to the use of government health facilities. For each EA in 2011, we take the percentage of respondents who report that they usually seek health care treatment or assistance at a government hospital. Table 3 and Table 4 show our model results for each of our respective council-level variables while controlling for our fourteen EA-level controls.
[ Table 3 and Table 4 
Perceptions of Government Health Services
Our second dependent variable measures citizens' perceptions of improvements in government health services during the previous year. We take the mean value of this response on [ Table 5 and Table 6 here] Here, four council-level variables achieve statistical significance at the 0.05 level in the bivariate regressions: former CDF participation, SLPP membership, chiefly contact, and selfreported disputes with chiefs. Councils with a greater percentage of former CDF members or a greater percentage of SLPP party members are both associated with more unfavorable perception of the quality of government health care provision.
The negative coefficient for chiefly contact indicates that a higher amount of contact between chiefs and councilors is associated with worsening perceptions of the quality of government health services. As median contact moves from its lowest value (1.8 times per month) to its highest value (11 times per month), this is associated with decrease of 0.58 points in the five-point scale (a move from 3.4 to 2.8). In contrast, the negative coefficient for the chiefly disputes variable suggests that frequent disputes increase the likelihood that respondents, on average, report an improvement in the quality of public health care. As the percentage of disputes moves from its lowest value per council (0 percent) to its highest value (17 percent), we see an associated 0.4 point increase on the response scale (moving from 3.1 to 3.5). Figure 3 below plots the average effect size as well as the council specific intercepts for each these measures of councilor/chief interactions. We also note that the negative coefficient for former CDF membership also follows the same theoretical pattern as the results that we have presented thus far. In Section 4.2, we hypothesized that higher levels of CDF membership during the war signaled closer pre-existing ties between councilors and chiefs, which we see here are associated with lower levels of EAlevel use of government health services.
Use of Government Schools
Our final dependent variable measures the 2011 average percentage of households per EA with school age children that report that their children attend government schools. In addition to the explanatory and control variables used in the models above, we also include the mean number of school age children reported in each EA. Table 7 and Table 8 show these model results with similar specifications as described above. Table 7 and Table 8 here] Across our bivariate council-level specifications with EA-level controls, only our measures of chiefly contact and disputes with chiefs achieve statistical significance. Figure 4 below shows the predicted values of these two variables. As median contact moves from its lowest value (1.8 times per month) to its highest value (11 times per month), the predicted percentage of school age children enrolled in government schools decreases from 41 percent to a mere 10 percent. In contrast, as the percentage of disputes moves from its lowest value per council (0 percent) to its highest value (17 percent), the predicted percentage of government school enrollment increases from 25 percent to 41 percent. 
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As a second robustness test, we run council-level interactions between the percentage of self-reported disputes and contact with chiefs for each of our three outcome variables of interest.
These interaction terms, which potentially signal whether our contact variable is measuring frequent dispute-related contact, do not achieve statistical significance across any of our three
12 !We also note that our results our robust to measuring self-reported contact with chiefs as a mean rather than median value, although we do not include these model results here.! As a final robustness consideration we test whether councilor-chief relations interact with any of our EA-level variables to affect the provision of local public goods. We do this through a series of theoretically motivated cross-level interactions. Cross-level interaction effects are an extension of random slope models in that they allow the effect size of councilor-chief relations (i.e. council-level slopes) to vary as a function of particular EA-levels variables. This serves both a robustness check to assess whether our council-level findings are consistent across EAs, as well as a way to reveal potential theoretically relevant EA-level moderators relating the effects of councilor-chief relations to the provision of local public goods.
First it is important to note that these cross-level effects are symmetrical in nature, meaning that we are agnostic about whether it is the council-level variable or the EA-level variable that acts as the moderating variable in any given model (Aguinis, Gottfredson and Culpepper 2013). For instance, when interpreting the cross-level interaction between councilorchief relations and EA remoteness on the provision of local public goods, the model cannot specify whether the remoteness of the EA moderates the relationship between councilor-chief interactions and public goods provision, or whether councilor-chief interactions moderate the effects of EA remoteness on public goods provision. Given that we are substantively interested in how our macro-level variables, councilor-chief relations, affect the provision of public goods, we include cross-level interactions in which it is conceivable that EA-level factors may moderate this relationship.
We first include distance to the chiefdom headquarters and distance to the district headquarters as possible EA-level moderators. Because chiefs might have stronger pre-existing power bases in areas closer to their chiefdom headquarters (and/or further away from district headquarters), these communities might experience the effects of councilor/chief relations more strongly than EAs that are located further away. We also include our EA-level measures indicating whether a local councilor or a Paramount Chief visited the EA during the previous year. We assume that areas that are visited more often by councilors and/or chiefs may be more We run cross-level interactions between our six potential EA-level moderator variables of interest (distance to chiefdom/district headquarters, EA visited by chief/councilor, 2008 baseline use of public health/education services) with each of the six models that proved statistically significant in the previous section. As is suggested widely in the literature (Gellman and Hill 2007, Aguinis, Gottfredson and Culpepper 2013), we first center our EA-level variables before running the interactions so that the coefficients associated with the interaction term can be interpreted as the slope change due to the cross-level interaction in comparison to an average council. We do not report the results of all thirty-six models here, but in Table 9 we display the statistically significant interaction effects.
[ Table 9 here]
We only find two statistically significant interaction effects across these thirty-six model specifications, and they are related to perceptions of improvements in local service delivery.
With this dependent variable, we find positive interaction effects between councilor-chief contact and both EA distance to the nearest chiefdom headquarters and to the nearest district headquarters. The effect magnitudes, however, are substantively equivalent to zero. We note that our main councilor-chief contact variable of interest maintains statistical significance across both these specifications. We conclude, therefore, that council-wide relationships with local Paramount Chiefs remain one of the most salient predictors in determining the provision of local public goods. 
Section 7: Discussion
We find that closer relationships between councilors and chiefs are largely associated with lower levels of local public goods provision, whereas relationships defined by inter-elite conflict are associated with higher levels of these goods. Specifically, our results indicate that more frequent contact between chiefs and councilors are associated with worse perceptions about the quality of public health services, decreased use of government schools, and decreased use of government health services. Additionally, a greater number of councilors from chiefly families are associated with lower usage levels of government health services. And finally, more frequent disputes between councilors and chiefs are associated with better perceptions about improvements in local public health services and higher EA-level rates of government school enrollment. Apart from our measures of councilor/chief relations, few other council-level variables are statistically significant across models.
Returning to the theoretical expectations we presented in Section 4, we find strong evidence that collusion between councilors and chiefs is detrimental to local development. These deleterious effects lead us to believe that when collusion occurs, it is likely better described as cooption rather than cooperation between the two groups, given that we hypothesized the latter would lead to positive development outcomes. Our evidence suggests that in areas in which councilors and chiefs have close-knit relationships, chiefs have been able capture the decisionmaking authority of councilors in such a way that limits the ability of the elected councilors to effectively provide local public goods.
As discussed in Section 4, this could be for several reasons. Close ties with chiefs may signal that councilors are part of chiefs' patronage-based authority structures in ways that privilege the distribution of private rather than public goods. In addition, accountability structures between citizens and local councilors are likely eroded when councilors draw their legitimacy from their relationships with hereditary chiefs rather than from their performance as elected officials. That is, relying on chiefs as local patrons weakens councilors' incentives to appeal to a broad base of voters. Of course, which exactly of these mechanisms are at play cannot be answered by the research tools used here -but suggest potential areas for supplementary qualitative research. In contrast we find that inter-elite relationships that are defined by competition are beneficial to both the provision of local public goods and citizens' would likely benefit from additional mechanisms that provide autonomy to new decision-making bodies so that they may operate free from the influence of traditional elites. On the other hand, when decentralization creates new institutions that successfully foster effective inter-elite competition, the theoretical benefits of devolved authority are more likely to unfold.
Finally, the survey-based evidence we have presented here suggests several potential areas for future work. Extensions of this research would benefit from additional questions on future rounds of the DSS surveys including more detailed questions about the nature of chiefs' relationships with councilors -for instance, how willing and/or cooperative they feel chiefs are in sharing authority. Additionally, social network data documenting relationships among councilors, ruling families, and chiefs could illuminate the extent of influence each group has among these sets of actors. Finally, the evidence we have presented here has revealed a series of Draft as of 11.06.2014 ! 33! quite strong findings that all support the same general theory -but this research would also benefit from more extensive qualitative as well as potential experimental approaches to better test for specific causal mechanisms related to inter-elite power-sharing in newly decentralized contexts -both in Sierra Leone and elsewhere. 
